WASHINGTON -- A review of official investigations of national missile defenses problems and potential extending back decades has revealed a steady stream of authoritative criticisms of the program.The technical problems that plagued the program in the 1980's continued through the 1990's and up to today.The report was compiled by Victoria A. Samson, Research Analyst for the Center for Defense Information.Today Reed and Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) will introduce an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill to strip $50 million in funding from the missile defense program.A 1987 General Accounting Office report, for example, found that SDIO needs to improve its ability to provide timely and effective management direction and oversight . . . It has experienced several problems that result from inefficiencies in contracting, inadequate oversight related to existing work directives, and limited progress in integrating system and battle management architectures.A 1998 official report by a blue ribbon panel, the Welch report, found: The rush to failure in flight testing has been partially caused by a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of developmental testing.This past March, an independent review team appointed by the Pentagon recommended major changes in the program because of recent test failures: "[T]he Independent Review Team recommends the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program enter a new phase focused on Performance and Reliability Verification"Reed stated, These reports provide overwhelming evidence that rather than thoroughly testing the missile defense system, the Administration is blindly spending billions of dollars every year with the exclusive goal of deploying a system that is ineffective and its capabilities untested.After more than 50 years of research, there is no compelling evidence that national missile defense will provide a reliable defense of the United States, Reed stated.While it had been expected that the Bush Administration would initiate round-the-clock deployment last year, the program appears to have been put on hold in light of persistent problems. The most recent official panel was established after national missile defense tests failures in December and February.Following is the compilation of the reports:Independent Review Team Findings and Recommendations, Presented to Director, Missile Defense Agency. March 31, 2005. http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/irt.pdf. Quote: [T]he Independent Review Team recommends the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Program enter a new phase focused on Performance and Reliability Verification, in which the Missile Defense Agency makes test and mission success the primary objective. The new phase should validate the technical baseline, and be event-driven rather than schedule-driven.Missile Defense: The Current Debate, Congressional Research Service report. Updated March 23, 2005. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31111.pdf. Quote: The development and deployment of missile defenses has not only been elusive, but has proven to be one of the most divisive issues of the past generation.GAO report GAO-05-243. Defense Acquisitions: Status of Missile Defense Programs in 2004. March 31, 2005. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05243.pdf.Quote: [T]he performance of the system remains uncertain and unverified, because a number of flight tests slipped into fiscal year 2005 and MDA has not successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test using operationally-representative hardware and software. Additionally, the development of the BMDS elements cost approximately $370 million more than planned during fiscal year 2004. Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) report for FY 04. Feb. 1, 2005. http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/DOTE_FY04.pdf. Quote: Numerous ground tests and exercises have demonstrated system interconnectivity and limited interoperability. However, the components of BMDS remain immature. It is not possible to estimate the current mission capability of the BMDS with high confidence. GAO Report GAO-04-409. Actions Are Needed to Enhance Testing and Accountability. April 23, 2004. http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d04409high.pdf. Quote: [T]he GMD element has not been tested under unscripted, operationally realistic conditions. Therefore, MDA faces the challenge of demonstrating whether the capabilities being fielded, consisting primarily of the GMD element, will perform as intended when the system becomes operational in 2004.GAO Report GAO-04-254. Missile Defense: Actions Being Taken to Address Testing Recommendations, but Updated Assessment Needed. Feb. 26, 2004. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04254.pdf. Quote: Predictions of how well the system will defeat long-range ballistic missiles are based on limited data. No component of the system to be fielded by September 2004 has been flight-tested in its deployed configuration. Significant uncertainties surround the capability to be fielded by September. DOT&E report for FY 03. Feb. 1, 2004. http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=2022&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=6&from_page=index.cfm.Quote: Due to the immature nature of the systems they emulate, models and simulations of the BMDS cannot be adequately validated at this time. Confidence in assessed capabilities will improve as more system performance data is gathered to anchor the simulations or directly demonstrate these capabilities.GAO Report GAO-03-600. Missile Defense: Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing System for Intercepting Long-Range Missiles. Aug. 21, 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03600.pdf.Quote: Because the President directed DOD to begin fielding a ballistic missile defense system in 2004, MDA began GMD system integration with technologies whose maturity has not been demonstrated. As a result, there is a greater likelihood that critical technologies will not work as intended in planned flight tests. If this occurs, MDA may have to spend additional funds in an attempt to identify and correct problems by September 2004 or accept a less capable system.GAO report GAO-03-767R. Information on Cancelled Integrated Flight Test-16 for Ground-based Midcourse Defense Element. May 8, 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03767r.pdfQuote: [W]ith the cancellation of IFT-16, MDA expects to have a 13-month gap between IFT-15, planned for January 2004, and IFT-17, planned for February 2005.GAO Report GAO-03-441. Knowledge-Based Practices are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain. April 30, 2003. http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d03441high.pdf.Quote: [T]he Presidents directive to being fielding a missile defense capability by 2004 places MDA in danger of getting off track early and impairing the effort over the long term. This danger is highlighted by MDAs decision to not follow some of its knowledge-based practices as it develops the first block of the system, While doing so may help MDA meet the Presidents deadline, it also increases the potential that some elements may not work as intended.DOT&E report for FY 02. Feb. 1, 2003. http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/bmds.cfm. Quote: Currently the planned test bed infrastructure for Block 2004 includes hardware and software components that are in active development. As the test bed matures and capabilities are demonstrated, an inherent defensive capability will develop. However, it will be very difficult to estimate operational availability or performance in real engagement conditions. This is a test bed, first and foremost.Director Operational Test and Evaluation Report in Support of the National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Review, aka Coyle report, as prepared by Philip E. Coyle, III, former Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. Aug. 10, 2000. http://www.cdi.org/news/missile-defense/coyle.pdfQuote: The NMD program has experienced significant delays in development and testing. Unless the program is restructured, the proposed deployment schedule is not likely to be realized.Report of the National Missile Defense Review Committee, aka second Welch report. Nov. 16, 1999.http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/report/1999/welsh.pdfQuote: It will take strong program management and top-level support to ensure that the performance requirements and basic system engineering and design functions are not sacrificed to the calendar since no decision will produce successful deployment until the system can be shown to perform as required.GAO Report GAO/NSIAD-98-153. National Missile Defense: Even With Increased Funding Technical and Schedule Risks are High. June 23, 1998. http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98153.pdf.Quote: Since our December 1997 report, DOD has increased funding and revised NMD program plans to mitigate schedule and technical risks. However, program officials told us that even with the mitigation actions resulting from the increased funding, schedule and technical risks associated with a 2003 deployment remain high.Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk In Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Programs, aka Welch report. Feb. 27, 1998. http://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/welch/index.html.Quote: The rush to failure in flight testing has been partially caused by a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of developmental testing. Some of these tests were treated as demonstrations of known capabilities where fly to verify was the purpose. The demonstration mindset was evident in flight tests conducted without complete component qualification and ground testing. In practice, the unknowns made them fly to learn experiences. One program office espoused the concept of test a little, learn a lot. The drive for early capability based on minimum capability demonstration has been a factor in this key demonstration mentality that is, a single success is regarded as a large step forward and becomes the criteria for a key program decision, such as exercising an option to buy operational missiles. This approach and mindset are sharp departures from experience on successful flight test programs that have followed the practice of learn a lot and then test to verify.GAO Report GAO/NSIAD-98-28. National Missile Defense: Schedule and Technical Risks Represent Significant Development Challenges. Dec. 12, 1997. http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98028.pdf. Quote: DOD faces significant challenges in the NMD program because of high schedule and technical risks. Schedule risk is high because the schedule requires a large number of activities to be completed in a relatively short amount of time, Technical risks are high because the compressed development schedule only allows limited testing, If subsequent tests reveal problems, costly redesign or modification of already produced hardware may be required. GAO Report GAO/NSIAD-92-282. Strategic Defense Initiative: Some Claims Overstated for Early Flight Tests of Interceptors. Sept. 8, 1992. http://archive.gao.gov/d35t11/147563.pdf. Quote: From January 1990 through March 1992, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) conducted seven flight tests of early experimental versions, SDIO claimed that five of the seven flight tests were successes and the other two were failures. GAO concluded that SDIO inaccurately described some results of four of the seven tests.GAO Report GAO/IMTEC-92-18. Strategic Defense Initiative: Changing Design and Technological Uncertainties Create Significant Risk. Feb. 19, 1992. http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/146113.pdf.Quote: To proceed with a system that uses both ground- and space-based interceptors, SDIO must overcome tremendous technical challenges. Such a system will push the cutting edge of technology. SDIO must rely on some technologies that are as yet unproven, and learn how to integrate them into a reliable system. Designing, developing, and deploying a system with these uncertainties increases the risk that the system will not provide the level of protection SDIO currently promises.GAO Report GAO/IMTEC-90-61. Strategic Defense System: Adequate Testing Must Precede Decision to Deploy. July 6, 1990. http://archive.gao.gov/d23t8/141805.pdf.Quote: The Strategic Defense System is being developed in several phases. Phase I will be built using existing technologies, Phase I has not received the scrutiny and oversight that Defense initially envisioned, The lack of effective agency oversight has contributed to the failure of other automated weapons systems, none of which matched the scale and technological complexity of Phase I. Consequently, any executive decision in 1993 to deploy Phase 1 would be premature and fraught with high risk.And SDIO has not yet solidified the role of Brilliant Pebbles or what elements will be in the final design. This causes problems because without a stable design detailed Strategic Defense System requirements cannot be determined, Further, an unstable design increases the probability that system requirements will not be adequately determined and sufficient testing will not be performed to ensure that the system works.GAO Report GAO/NSIAD-88-26. Strategic Defense Initiative Program: Better Management Direction and Controls Needed. Nov. 27, 1987. http://archive.gao.gov/d29t5/134496.pdf.Quote: The Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, asked GAO to assess the SDI Organizations (SDIO) management of the Systems Analysis and Battle Management (SABM) program element, particularly as it related to the BM/C3 component, SDIO needs to improve its ability to provide timely and effective management direction and oversight of the SABM program. It has experienced several problems that result from inefficiencies in contracting, inadequate oversight related to existing work directives, and limited progress in integrating system and battle management architectures. The problem, if not corrected, could reduce SDIOs ability to provide needed information for an informed systems development decision planned for the early 1990s.