As he carefully considers the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached between the United States, Iran, and the international community, Senator Reed has made the following public statements:


Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

(As prepared for delivery)

 

SD-G50

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Wednesday, August 5, 2015

 

Hearing on the Defense Implications of

the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Good Morning. Over the past two weeks, the Chairman has assembled a series of hearings on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. Last week, the President’s representatives – four cabinet secretaries and the country’s most senior military officer – made the case for the agreement, both on the terms of the deal itself and the way forward with our friends and allies in the Middle East.  Yesterday, the committee heard from a number of former senior government officials with experience in the diplomatic, intelligence, and military communities.  Today, the committee will hear from additional witnesses who bring with them a vast array of experience on the region, non-proliferation issues, and sanctions implementation policy. 

I want to thank the Chairman for assembling this series of hearings for the committee.  They have provided a superb venue for understanding the dynamics that shaped the P5+1 negotiations and for assessing the impacts of the agreement on Iran’s calculations with respect to its nuclear program and regional ambitions.

I want to pose the same questions to this panel that I asked yesterday.  First and foremost, I hope you will provide an assessment of whether the deal is the best available option to prevent the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  I also specifically hope each of you will address:

(1)   The terms of the agreement itself, particularly with respect to cutting-off the paths to a nuclear device, the sufficiency of the duration of the elements of the agreement, and the breakout time necessary for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon;

(2)  The alternatives, if any, to the JCPOA;

(3)  The inspections regime under the deal, including any lessons-learned from past international inspections regimes that have been incorporated into this deal;

(4)  The role and capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement this deal; and

(5)   The sanctions regime under the JCPOA and availability of similar tools the United States will have at its disposal for targeting Iran as a result of support for terrorism, regional destabilizing activities and human rights abuses.

Aside from the JCPOA, I would also appreciate our witnesses providing their assessment of two other crucial areas.  First, while the P5+1 negotiated this agreement, none of us share a border with Iran.  Our partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, all share land or maritime borders with Iran.  This makes Iran’s activities in the region a far more tangible problem.  The Camp David summit earlier this year continued our engagement with our GCC partners on this issue and Secretary Kerry is in the region this week working on the next steps of our efforts to enhance the GCC’s ballistic missile defense capability and to improve their interoperability and collective defense against asymmetric threats.  I hope our witnesses will provide their assessment of this endeavor.

Second, Israel rightly views Iran as a significant and ongoing threat to their national security interests.  I would be interested in hearing the assessment of the witnesses on how the United States might move forward with Israel under this agreement to protect our shared national security interests.

I look forward to the panel’s responses as we continue to deepen our understanding this agreement.

Thank you.

Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

(As prepared for delivery)

 

SD-G50

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Tuesday, August 4, 2015

 

Hearing on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

and the Military Balance in the Middle East

Good Morning.  We are fortunate to have before us today witnesses that have served time in the military, diplomatic, and intelligence entities of our government and that have a range of knowledge and experience in issues relating to the Middle East, non-proliferation, asymmetric warfare, and matters of war and peace.  This is our second hearing relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, and I want to thank Chairman McCain for his efforts to make sure the committee is presented with a range of views and opinions on the JCPOA.    

In the weeks ahead, Congress has an obligation to review carefully the details of this agreement and to validate that the agreement will meet our common goal of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. This week’s hearings are part of that effort.

Last week, the committee held a hearing with the Secretaries of Treasury, State, Defense and Energy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  That hearing was important as it provided the committee with the Administration’s views on the agreement, plans for regional engagement in the months and years ahead, and an opportunity to better understand the details of the agreement – from Iran’s enrichment capabilities under the JCPOA to how snapback sanctions would be imposed if the terms of the agreement were violated.    

I hope our witnesses today will provide their assessment of whether the deal is the best available option to prevent the Iranians from obtaining a nuclear weapon – both in the near and long term.  I specifically hope they will address a number of areas:

(1)   The terms of the agreement itself, particularly with respect to cutting-off the paths to a nuclear device, past military dimensions of their program, duration, and the breakout time necessary for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon;

(2)  The alternatives, if any, to the JCPOA;

(3)  The inspections regime under the deal, including lessons-learned from past international inspections that have been incorporated into this deal;

(4)  The role and capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement this deal; and

(5)   The sanctions regime under the JCPOA and availability of those tools to be used against Iran in situations of terrorism, regional destabilizing activities and human rights abuses.

While the implementation of this agreement will not be performed by the Department of Defense, the DOD will have a critical role in implementing the regional engagement policies and programs laid out at Camp David with our Gulf Cooperation Council partners.  Secretary Kerry is in the region this week and is working with our GCC partners on the next steps of this policy to enhance the ballistic missile defense capability of the GCC and to improve their interoperability and collective defense against asymmetric threats.  These are important efforts that I look forward to hearing about today.

Israel rightly views Iran as a significant and ongoing threat to their national security interests.  And, while Prime Minister Netanyahu is unlikely to ever endorse this agreement, the United States should make every effort to deepen further our cooperation on military and intelligence matters with Israel.  I would be interested in hearing the assessment of the witnesses on how the United States might successfully move forward with the Netanyahu government under this agreement.

I want to make one final point.  These negotiations focused on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran would be a more formidable force in the region. And, as it has repeatedly demonstrated, not a force for peace and stability, but one that supports terror and seeks to impose its will throughout the Middle East. Moreover, a nuclear Iran would likely prompt a regional nuclear arms race that through accident or design could lead to catastrophe. None of us would condone or ignore Iran’s support of terror, or other destabilizing activities in the region, but these negotiations were properly focused on nuclear weapons.

I look forward to the panel’s responses as we continue to deepen our understanding this agreement.

Thank you.


Opening Statement of U.S. Senator Jack Reed

Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

(As Prepared for Delivery)

 

SD-G50

Dirksen Senate Office Building

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

 

Hearing on the impacts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) on

U.S. interests & the military balance in the Middle East.

Good Morning. Secretary Lew, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Carter, Secretary Moniz, and General Dempsey, your appearance before the committee comes a little more than two weeks after the world woke up to the news that after 20 months of negotiations, the P5+1 and Iran agreed on the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.  The agreement, no matter your position on it, is historic and, if implemented scrupulously, could serve as a strategic inflection point in the world’s relations with Iran, for international non-proliferation efforts, and for the political and security dynamics in the Middle East.  I commend the President and his negotiating team – from cabinet officials to our nation’s scientists – for their persistence and hard work. 

In the weeks ahead, Congress has a solemn obligation to carefully review the details of this historic agreement and to independently validate that the agreement will meet our common goal of stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Today’s hearing is part of that obligation, and I look forward to your testimony.

Secretary Kerry, you were the key architect of this agreement and your willingness to take on what I am sure feels like a thankless endeavor is to be commended.  I hope you will help us understand why it is your assessment that this agreement is a good deal and how you intend to direct our diplomats in the field to work with our partners in the region to address Iran’s destabilizing activities in the region.

Secretary Moniz, you played an important role in the negotiations, and you too have been a strong advocate for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action throughout.  During your testimony, I hope you will help us understand what gives you confidence in the technical safeguards built into this agreement, particularly with regard to: (1) the cutting off of Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon; (2) the cradle-to-grave access and auditability of the supply chain; (3) the dedicated procurement channel to manage all purchases of the Nuclear Supplier Group’s “trigger list” and dual-use items; (4) the IAEA Additional Protocol for enhanced inspections,  and it is designed for detecting elements of a covert weapons program; and (5) the limitations on Iran’s enrichment program.  Secretary Carter, you are a unique Secretary of Defense with a Ph.D. in physics and having spent so much of your career on nuclear weapons, I look forward to your technical insights on these elements as well.

Secretary Carter and General Dempsey, while neither of you were a party to the negotiations, you have both recently travelled to the Middle East to speak with your counterparts about the agreement’s potential implications for regional security.  During your meetings you undoubtedly heard the assessments of our partners and allies on a range of issues, including how Iran may use sanctions relief to pursue its regional ambitions, expand its support to terrorist proxies, and invest more heavily in its military.  These are serious concerns and ones which I share.

Our partners in Israel see Iran as a significant and ongoing threat to their national security interests.  While Prime Minister Netanyahu is unlikely to ever endorse this historic deal, it is incumbent upon the United States to deepen further our cooperation on military and intelligence matters with Israel and to better understand the concerns of the Israelis.

It is also critical that our partners and allies in the Middle East know that the United States will not abandon the region in the wake of this nuclear agreement and that we will continue to stand alongside them as we confront common state and non-state threats.  The May 2015 Joint Statement following the U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council, or GCC, meetings at Camp David provided a roadmap for how the Administration intends to proceed.  It also makes clear that the Department of Defense will be at the forefront of these efforts. 

Critics of the Vienna agreement point to perceived flaws related to Iran’s ballistic missile capability and its support of terrorist proxies across the region.  The Camp David Joint Statement outlines our commitment to enhancing the ballistic missile defense capability of the GCC and improving their interoperability to increase collective defense.  In order to counter Iran’s support of terrorist proxies, the Joint Statement indicates that we will be increasing our training and exercise engagements with GCC Special Operations Forces elements so as to better enable our partners to confront Iran’s asymmetric capabilities.  These are important efforts that I look forward to hearing about today.

There are some aspects of this agreement that are not in the purview of our committee.  For example, sanctions relief and the sanction snapback arrangements.  As a member of the Banking Committee, I intend to study these issues closely as that committee holds a hearing next week.

I want to make one final point.  These negotiations focused on denying Iran a pathway to a nuclear weapon. A nuclear Iran would be a more formidable force in the region. And, as it has repeatedly demonstrated, not a force for peace and stability, but one that supports terror and seeks to impose its will throughout the Middle East. Moreover, a nuclear Iran would likely prompt a nuclear arms race in the region that through accident or design could lead to catastrophe. None of us would condone or ignore Iran’s support of terror, or other destabilizing activities in the region, but the focus of these negotiations were properly focused on nuclear weapons.

The history of arms control makes this point. As Fred Kaplan, a noted national security expert, pointed out: “[t]he U.S.-Soviet strategic arms treaties, signed throughout the Cold War, didn’t require the Soviet Union to disavow communism, end its support of Third World insurgencies, or institute Jeffersonian democracy—but the deals were still very useful. They capped, and in the later years reversed, the nuclear arms race; and they provided a forum for diplomacy, a cooling-off of the distrust and hatred, at a time when no other issues could have done so.”

I look forward to the panel’s responses as we continue to understand this agreement and evaluate its capacity to cut off all pathways to a nuclear device and provide long-term warning of violations so that an appropriate response can take place.

Thank you.

Reed Statement on the Iran Nuclear Agreement

July 17, 2015

WASHINGTON, DC -- Today, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, issued the following statement regarding the Iran nuclear agreement:

“This agreement demonstrates the power of American-led diplomacy and establishes a strict and robust monitoring and verification system.  If fully implemented, this deal will help control Iran’s pathways to a nuclear weapon.

“As President Obama points out, the accord is not built on trust, but on verification.  Any attempt by Iran to break the rules or covertly pursue nuclear weapons must be met with swift, forceful, and decisive action by the United States and the international community.

“It has taken nearly two years of persistent, rigorous negotiations to reach this point.  President Obama and his negotiating team - at every echelon, including our scientists and nuclear experts - deserve the nation’s thanks.

“In the weeks ahead, Congress has a solemn obligation to carefully review the details of this historic agreement and to independently confirm that we are meeting our common goal of stopping Iran from building a nuclear weapon and making our nation, and the world, a safer place.”

Now that an agreement between the P5+1 group (the United States, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, plus Germany) and Iran has been reached, Congress will have a 60-day window to review the agreement.  The 60-day clock will begin once a number of documents, including certifications from the Director of National Intelligence, are submitted to the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, which could take place in the coming days. 

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